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Preface 
This document presents results of an analysis of operational hazards and safety requirements for Traffic Aware 
Strategic Aircrew Requests (TASAR).  The document was prepared by Rockwell Collins, Inc., Cedar Rapids, IA 
under Contract No.  NNL12AA11C with NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA.  The NASA Technical 
Monitor is David J. Wing. 
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1. Introduction 
This report provides the results of safety analyses performed for the NASA Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew 
Requests (TASAR) application [1] to identify Operational Hazards and Safety Requirements for TASAR as an 
application that can be hosted on a Portable Electronic Device (PED) / Portable Electronic Flight Bag (EFB).  Two 
safety assessment methodologies were used that are compliant with the Safety Management System (SMS) of the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA): 
 
Method 1 A traditional safety assessment featuring an identification of hazards for the intended function of the 
system being developed, determination of worst credible effect due to the hazard, and subsequent 
Failure Effects Classification using Aviation Recommended Practice (ARP) 4761 [2], Advisory 
Circular (AC) 25-1309 [3] and AC 23-1309 [4] for Part 23 and Part 25 aircraft operations 
 
Method 2 Operational Safety Analysis according to RTCA DO-264 / EUROCAE Document (ED) 178A [5]. 
 
Section 2 of this report provides a high-level description and assessment of the two safety methodologies. 
The intended function of TASAR is to serve as an advisory-only, decision support tool to the pilot / flight crew 
to offer trajectory change request (Change Request) recommendations for improvement opportunities to the current 
flight plan.  Section 3 briefly reviews the Change Request process as it is used in today‟s operations. 
Section 4 provides a high-level overview and description of the TASAR concept of operation.  Section 5 
describes the intended function of TASAR whose safety case is evaluated.  The safety analyses using Method 1 and 
Method 2 are presented in Sections 6 and 7, respectively.  Section 8 serves as a report summary, followed by list of 
references in Section 9. 
2. Approach to Safety Assessment 
Two safety assessment approaches were used to determine the Failure Effects Classification for TASAR.  The 
Failure Effects Classifications are based on Operational Hazards and available mitigations that were identified using 
these two methods.  The two safety analyses conclude that the worst case failure effects for TASAR will likely be of 
“No Effect” Failure Effect Classification and no higher than “Minor” Failure Effect Classification.  This 
determination is subject to evaluation and approval by cognizant FAA certification and operational approval 
organizations responsible for authorization of EFB applications.  Supporting rationale for the “No Effect” 
designation is provided in the safety analyses in Sections 5 and 6. 
Note: In addition to the safety analyses documented in this report, a parallel effort examined “EFB Standards 
Adherence Requirements for TASAR” [6].  The analysis identifies requirements for TASAR as an EFB application, 
while considering EFB hardware, software, mounting, Class of EFB (i.e., 1, 2, 3), Type of EFB software (i.e., A, B), 
etc.  The results from [6] and from this report designate TASAR as likely a “No Effect” Failure Effect Classification 
and no higher than “Minor” Failure Effect Classification.  Additional efforts are in progress that will result in 
artifacts appropriate for seeking TASAR EFB certification and operational approval. 
2.1. Method 1 Safety Assessment 
Method 1 is based on the analyses indicated by ARP-4761, AC 25-1309, AC 23-1309 and represents the 
traditional system safety process for airborne systems and equipment, e.g., TASAR.  This method performs the 
following steps relative to the intended function of the new system capability: 
1) Evaluate the intended function per phase of flight 
2) Identify failure events, e.g., loss of function; undetected, erroneous Change Request(s), etc. 
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3) Examine the effect of the these failures on aircraft, pilot (or flight crew), and Air Traffic Control 
(ATC) 
4) Determine the Hazard Classification, e.g., Major, Minor, No Effect 
5) Determine frequency of occurrence, e.g., per flight hour, per operation 
6) Provide rationale for hazard assessment. 
2.2. Method 2 Safety Assessment 
Method 2 is based on RTCA DO-164 / ED-78A and represents a system-of-systems analysis approach that is 
well-suited for allocating safety requirements across a high-criticality, multiple-system function.  This allows a more 
balanced allocation of safety requirements across systems and sub-systems, which is particularly beneficial for 
higher criticality systems.  While an excellent approach for systems analysis, it is not as well suited for lower 
criticality systems such as TASAR.  This is particularly true in the realm of “Minor” criticality systems, where this 
approach puts excessive emphasis on formal analysis related to operational effects such as workload (pilots and air 
traffic controllers), which are often highly subjective and difficult to assess in a quantitative manner. 
Method 2 follows the following evaluation steps: 
1) Perform an Operational Hazard Assessment (OHA) 
a. Identify Operational Hazards 
b. Determine the worst credible outcome of the Operational Hazard, i.e., the Operational Effect, e.g., 
collision, loss of separation, workload, etc. 
c. Determine the Severity Classes for each Operational Effect, e.g., Catastrophic, Major, Minor, etc., 
and identify the maximum allowable probability of occurrence of the Operational Effect 
d. Determine the Effects Probabilities, which represent the probabilities of available mitigation(s) to 
the system to help reduce the probability of occurrence of the Operational Effect due to the 
Operational Hazard 
e. Assign Safety Objectives, which represent the probability of occurrence of each Operational Hazard 
that is allowable for ensuring the safety of the application 
f. Identify External Mitigation Means, i.e., barriers external to the application that reduce the adverse 
effects and impact to safety when Operational Hazards occur. 
2) Allocate Safety Objectives and Safety Requirements 
a. Identify Abnormal Events and Basic Causes internal to the applications that could lead to the 
occurrence of each Operational Hazard 
b. Identify Internal Mitigation Means, i.e., barriers internal to the application that reduce the probability 
of the Operational Hazard from occurring in order to achieve the required Safety Objective 
c. Allocate Safety Requirements to the sub-functions comprising the application. 
3. Trajectory Change Requests – Today’s Operations 
This section briefly describes the Change Request process in today‟s operations between the pilot and ATC for 
making Change Requests to the current flight plan.  As conditions change during flight, it is common for the pilot to 
request an amendment to the ATC-cleared trajectory, e.g., to meet some need for safety, efficiency, or ride quality / 
comfort for passengers. 
In today‟s operations, pilot requests are often made with little or no awareness of the traffic situation or ATC 
sector considerations.  Some of these Change Requests are denied by ATC for the following reasons: 
1) Change Request conflicts with other traffic 
2) Change Request conflicts with sector procedures in use by ATC 
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3) Change Request is requested too close to the next sector handoff 
The effects of denial of a Change Request by ATC to the pilot are: 
1) Unnecessary workload burden on ATC 
2) Discourages the pilot from making future requests to improve their flight 
3) Flight improvement opportunities are often unrealized because pilot may not be aware of requests that 
would improve efficiency and be ATC approvable. 
In general, the pilot seeking opportunities of improved safety, efficiency, or ride quality has rather limited 
awareness of many of the factors that would adversely affect ATC acceptability of Change Requests to the current 
flight plan.  This environment is not conducive for the pilot to seek operational efficiency improvements due to lack 
of situational awareness of the external environment that may constrain changes to the flight plan. 
The next section explores a new TASAR capability that serves as an advisory-only tool to the pilot, providing 
informed Change Request candidates for pilot consideration as possible Change Requests to ATC for operational 
benefit. 
4. TASAR Overview / High-Level Description 
The TASAR EFB application [1] is currently being developed by NASA in order to leverage emerging flight 
deck technologies for cost benefits to current flight operations [7,8].  Among the systems technologies that comprise 
or support TASAR are flight-optimizing software algorithms, a software hosting device such as a PED EFB, 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) In and other sources of traffic information, and additional 
ground-based information via data link, internet connectivity, etc.  TASAR seeks to provide cost-beneficial 
optimization with respect to the current flight plan, taking traffic and other constraints into account.  The TASAR 
application, using these information sources has the ability to react in an agile manner to changes in the external 
airspace environment (e.g., adverse weather, winds, airspace constraints, and / or improved timeliness and accuracy 
of information about factors that affect the aircraft‟s execution of its flight plan). 
The TASAR EFB application (referred to here as TASAR) is a flight deck-based decision support tool that 
seeks to identify and recommend trajectory improvement opportunities to the pilot that have high probability of 
approval by ATC.  Utilizing available information of own-ship flight status and plan, and airspace environment 
(e.g., proximate traffic, weather, winds, ATC system status, etc.), TASAR seeks to identify and recommend 
candidate trajectories for consideration by the pilot that have higher probability of ATC approval.  The pilot, at his 
or her discretion, can choose to issue a Change Request to ATC based on TASAR recommended trajectory change 
candidates. 
Prior to recommending trajectory change candidates to the pilot, TASAR performs the following steps, 1) it 
evaluates the proposed trajectory change(s) against available on-board traffic data for potential conflicts, and 2) it 
may account for known ATC sector rules and own-ship flight position relative to the sector.  Thus, recommended 
Trajectories Change Request candidates from TASAR to the pilot are expected to have the following characteristics 
that will encourage increased pursuit of flight plan improvements by the pilot from ATC via Change Requests: 
1) Have a high potential for approval by ATC by considering ATC preferences in the identification 
process 
2) Meet operational goals for the flight, as provided by pilot preferences that are input to TASAR 
3) Provide improvement to the current flight plan in terms of time and / or fuel saved or other desired 
attributes such as passenger comfort. 
TASAR Change Request candidates are advisory-only to the pilot, and the pilot has full discretion on whether 
or not to select a TASAR-provided trajectory change for a subsequent Change Request to ATC.  Pilot training 
ensures that aviate-navigate-communicate piloting tasks, procedures, and coordination with ATC (e.g., Change 
Requests) are followed as in today‟s operations.  The pilot has responsibility to evaluate TASAR-provided trajectory 
change candidates before making a Change Request to ATC to minimize spurious Change Requests from being 
made to ATC.  As in today‟s operations, ATC has separation responsibility, and ATC will not approve Change 
Requests from the pilot that do not meet ATC constraints and requirements. 
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5. Intended Function Description 
TASAR is a flight deck-based decision aid consisting of software automation algorithms and a textual display 
and is intended as an advisory-only service to the pilot to seek trajectory improvement opportunities over the current 
flight plan.  TASAR is expected to be implemented as a hosted software application on an EFB.  A Class 2 EFB 
installation is anticipated, with TASAR becoming a future Type B software application, pending successful 
certification and operational approvals by FAA (refer to [6] for a comprehensive assessment of FAA EFB 
regulations and guidance on PED / Portable EFB-based flight deck applications).  The TASAR EFB will interface to 
avionics as read-only (i.e., it will not transmit to avionics) as defined in the current concept of operations. 
Based on inputs provided by 1) the pilot (in the form of flight objectives and optimization criteria), 2) on-board 
avionics systems, and 3) airborne internet data connectivity, the TASAR application computes available Change 
Request candidates that may improve the current flight plan.  Change Request candidates provided by TASAR are 
intended to have relatively high probability of ATC approval if requested by the pilot, as TASAR seeks to provide 
flight-optimizing, traffic-avoiding recommended trajectory candidates that anticipate ATC and airspace constraints. 
The pilot has full discretion on the use of TASAR-provided Change Request information; they can choose to 
use TASAR-recommended Change Request candidates as part of a Change Request to ATC, or they can choose to 
ignore them.  TASAR can be manually inhibited at any time, for any reason.  Thus, in the event of observed 
spurious behavior of TASAR due to any system failure, inaccurate data obtained via network enabled information 
sources, or TASAR being a source of distraction to the flight crew, the pilot can simply inhibit or ignore TASAR.  
By following their training, the pilot can manage the use of TASAR in such away so that TASAR will not result in 
any workload increase in the flight deck. 
TASAR is a supplemental system intended to provide operational benefits without adversely impacting safe 
operations, and it does not replace any aircraft system or procedure needed for flight operations.  The TASAR 
display is passive with no graphical display of traffic or audible alerting.  Loss of the TASAR EFB application for 
any reason does not affect the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) and does not affect normal flight operations. 
TASAR information sources may include the following: 
1) Own-ship systems (aircraft state, auto-flight settings, flight plan and performance information from 
Flight Management System (FMS), etc.) 
2) Traffic data via ADS-B In, Traffic Information Service Broadcast (TIS-B), or other sources such as 
airborne internet 
3) Airspace system status and forecast (sector use and configuration, Traffic Management Initiatives, 
Special Activity Airspace, etc.) 
4) Weather status / forecast 
5) Wind status / forecast 
6) Operator flight planning, preferences, and objectives. 
6. Method 1 Safety Analysis – Conventional Method 
This section addresses the safety assessment of TASAR using the traditional system safety process based on 
ARP 4761 [2], AC 25-1309 [3], and AC 23-1309 [4].  As noted earlier in Section 2, this safety assessment method 
analyzes the TASAR intended function (Section 5) using the steps outlined in Section 2. 
The key outcome of this safety assessment process is the determination of the Failure Effects Classification of 
the TASAR application.  The Failure Effects Classification then drives the development and validation requirements 
and processes to be followed in integrating TASAR into the flight deck to gain certification and operational 
approval. 
Using this safety assessment process (i.e., Method 1), applicants and certification and operational authorities 
(i.e., FAA aircraft certification and flight standards organizations) follow the process of assessing the new 
application and attendant procedures for potential failure modes and their impact on safety. 
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6.1. Key Factors that Influence Failure Effect Classification of TASAR  
The following list represents key factors that influence the determination of the Failure Effect Classification for 
TASAR: 
1) TASAR is a supplemental system and thus is not relied on by critical functions supporting flight deck 
operations 
2) TASAR is optional, i.e., not a required system for flight operations.  In the event of failures of the 
TASAR system, TASAR can be ignored or disabled without adversely affecting operations 
3) TASAR has no MEL requirement 
4) TASAR can be manually inhibited at any time, for any reason: 
a. Detected failure of the TASAR application 
b. Detected failure of the host EFB 
c. Spurious or inconsistent performance of recommended Change Requests 
d. Distracting effects of TASAR to the pilot 
5) Presence or loss of TASAR does not change responsibilities of the pilot for flight operations 
6) TASAR is an “advisory-only” system (i.e., does not provide guidance information): 
a. Pilot is not reliant on TASAR outputs to any extent to perform flight operations 
b. Pilot can choose to either utilize or ignore Change Requests candidates recommended by TASAR as 
part of Change Requests to ATC 
7) Change Request procedures are unchanged: 
a. Pilot must direct all Change Requests to ATC using conventional means 
b. ATC is responsible for reviewing request for acceptability, including separation from traffic 
c. ATC either 1) approves request and issues clearance, 2) provides an amended clearance, 3) defers 
request to next controller, or 4) denies request 
8) Undetected, misleading information associated with TASAR outputs, i.e., with one or more candidate 
Change Request recommendations, will have “No Effect” on the pilot, aircraft, and/or on ATC.  
Whether due to failure of one of the TASAR sub-systems and associated automation processing, or 
being the result of inaccurate data obtained from ground-based or flight deck systems, spurious Change 
Requests are mitigated by flight crew inspection of the recommended trajectory change and by 
mitigation associated with the existing Change Request process. 
6.2. Failure Effects Classification 
Figure 1 (from [3]) provides a mapping of the “Effects” due to failures and the allowable “Probability of 
Occurrence” that lead to the determination of the Failure Effects Classification of the planned application (i.e., 
TASAR).  Based on the above noted factors alone, this safety analysis (Method 1) concludes that TASAR can be 
safely developed and implemented with a “No Effect” designation.  Potentially, in the worst case, TASAR could rise 
to a “Minor Effect” designation in event of inconsistent candidate Change Request recommendation(s), which could 
result in workload issues for the pilot and / or ATC.  However, workload issues are not anticipated to be an issue for 
the pilot‟s use of TASAR, as the pilot can simply ignore TASAR for any reason.  Through proper training in the use 
of TASAR, the pilot should not allow to be distracted or be adversely influenced in using TASAR while conducting 
flight operations.  From an ATC perspective, controllers will continue to conduct the Change Request process as in 
today‟s operation and are not expected to experience a workload issue due to TASAR. 
Final determination of the Failure Effects Classification for TASAR will require a dialog between the applicant 
and FAA Certification and Operational Approval authorities using the results of the safety analysis, which will result 
in a final designation by FAA. 
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Figure 1  Acceptable Risk versus Potential Effects (as defined for Civil Aviation) (from [3]) 
6.3. Internal Mitigation Means 
The TASAR application itself provides additional inherent capabilities that further reduce the possibility of 
unintended adverse effects and are expected to enhance the usability of the application.  The following TASAR 
capabilities further serve to strengthen and support the “No Effects” Failure Effects Classification for TASAR: 
1) In order to prevent lengthy, complex Change Requests from the pilot to ATC, TASAR utilizes 
standard navigation databases and places limits on excessive waypoints included in the recommended 
Change Requests it provides 
2) TASAR displays flight path change opportunities using standard flight planning textual depictions to 
facilitate voice communications 
3) TASAR may include capabilities to assess sector complexity and own-ship‟s proximity to the sector 
boundary in order to only recommend Change Requests that have a high likelihood of being approved 
by ATC. 
6.4. Procedural Mitigations Available to the Pilot 
1) An additional characteristic of TASAR is that there is no “recovery” time required for the flight crew 
associated with its use.  In other words, in using TASAR, the pilot remains on an ATC-cleared 
trajectory at all times.  In the event of a TASAR system fault, the pilot need only remain on the current 
clearance while disregarding the TASAR display.  A simple reset of TASAR, or by simply choosing to 
ignore TASAR inputs (e.g., by not looking at the TASAR display) allows the pilot to continue to focus 
on aviate-navigate-communicate priorities in conducting flight operations (whether during normal 
operations or in the event of abnormal or emergency situations). 
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2) The pilot has responsibility to evaluate TASAR-provided Trajectory Change Request candidates 
before making a Change Request to ATC, providing cross-check opportunities to detect spurious or 
false Trajectory Change Request candidates being offered by TASAR 
3) Aircraft systems, e.g., FMS, weather radar, serve as available, higher integrity information allowing 
quick check on acceptability and performance impacts of TASAR recommended Change Requests 
6.5. Phase of Flight Considerations 
From a phase of flight perspective, TASAR is intended for use primarily during en-route operations.  Change 
Request candidates are offered by TASAR during the later portion of climb, while en-route, and to a lesser extent, 
into the early portion of descent operations.  TASAR is thus used primarily during non-critical phases of flight, i.e., 
above 10,000 ft. 
6.6. Information Source Quality 
Due to the “No Effect / Minor Effect” Failure Effects Classification anticipated for TASAR, information source 
quality and integrity must be commensurate to support this Failure Effects Classification.  TASAR input information 
quality and integrity requirements are driven more by operational use issues than by safety considerations. Low 
quality and/or misleading information can result in poor recommendations to the pilot for candidate Change 
Requests.  The net effect is that TASAR will not be as effective in achieving envisioned operational benefits (e.g., 
time or fuel saved). 
6.7. Undetected Failure – Worst Case Effect 
In the event of an undetected failure of the TASAR automation, inefficient routing is the only adverse outcome.  
Existing mitigation of any safety hazards is provided by ATC, as already is done for Change Requests today without 
TASAR. 
Note: The Safety Analysis using Method 2 described in the next section takes a closer look at specific failure 
modes of TASAR. 
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7. Method 2 Safety Analysis – Operational Safety Assessment Process 
This section provides the safety analysis of TASAR using the Operational Safety Assessment (OSA) process 
from RTCA DO-264 / EUROCAE ED-78A [5], referred to as Method 2 in this report.  Figure 2 illustrates the 
process at a high-level using the „bow-tie‟ model. 
 
 
 
Figure 2  Operational Safety Assessment Process – Method 2 
In Figure 2, the system of interest, in this case the TASAR application, is represented in the left-hand side of the 
bow-tie.  The external environment in which the application operates, including environmental conditions (e.g., 
airspace influences, weather, traffic) and the external systems that are part of the overall operational concept (e.g., 
aircraft systems and ATC systems), are represented by the right-hand side of the bow-tie. 
The OSA process consists of the following major sub-processes: 1) the Operational Hazard Assessment (OHA), 
and 2) Allocation of Safety Objectives and {Safety} Requirements (ASOR). 
In performing the OHA, the first step is to use operational experts from all stakeholder communities to identify 
potential Operational Hazards that may result from the application (e.g., TASAR).  For each identified Operational 
Hazard, the next step is to determine the worst “credible” outcome, also referred to as the Operational Effect (OE).  
Examples are collision, loss of separation (major loss versus minor loss), workload, etc. 
For each Operational Hazard and associated Operational Effect, the Severity Class is determined.  Severity 
Classes include catastrophic, severe major, major, minor, and no effect.  For each Operational Effect and associated 
Severity Class, a “Probability of Occurrence” not to be exceeded to assure safety of operations are established, 
ranging from 10-9, 10-7, 10-5, 10-3, etc.  for occurrence of the Operational Effect.  The Operational Effects and 
Severity Classes are noted in Figure 2 on the right side of the bow-tie. 
Figure 3 provides a mapping of hazards to the associated effects on operations due to each hazard class.  The 
likely regions of applicability for the TASAR Operational Safety Assessment process described in this section are 
highlighted in Figure 3.  The highlighted regions represent “Minor” and “No Effects” Failure Effect Classifications. 
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Figure 3  ED78A/DO264 Based Hazard Classification Matrix 
From the OHA sub-process, each Operational Hazard is assigned a Safety Objective that must be met in order 
to assure safe operations.  It is the task of the ASOR to ensure that the Safety Objective is met.  It is noted that for 
each Operational Hazard, there could be multiple Operational Effects, thus resulting in multiple Safety Objectives 
being assigned to each Operational Hazard.  The ASOR must assure that all Safety Objectives are met for each 
Operational Hazard. 
In order to mitigate the effects of the Abnormal Events and Basic Causes identified as root causes of failures, it 
will be necessary to identify relevant mitigations internal to the application, denoted as Internal Mitigation Means.  
These mitigate the effects of Abnormal Events and Basic Causes to achieve the Safety Objectives for each 
Operational Hazard.  This then also allows the specification of Safety Requirements that are associated with sub-
system elements internal to the application.  The combination of Abnormal Events, Basic Causes, Internal 
Mitigation Means, Safety Objectives, and Safety Requirements are illustrated by the left-side of the bow-tie. 
The OSA process in [5] is beginning to be widely used by EUROCONTROL and FAA in the development of 
Safety, Performance, and Interoperability Requirements for ADS-B In applications.  This process is well suited for 
higher criticality system-of-systems and allows a more formal analysis process using fault trees and event trees.  
Fault Trees are typically used to capture the left-hand side of the bow-tie process of the ASOR, while Event Trees 
are typically used to represent the OHA process characterizing the external environmental factors represented by the 
right-hand side of the bow-tie. 
While the strength of the OSA process is that it is able to analyze complex, high-criticality system-of-systems 
and allows for a relatively balanced approach for allocating integrity requirements across all systems, the process 
may not be as well suited for lower-criticality systems, e.g., TASAR, as the fault tree and event tree methodologies 
and associated calculations begin to become onerous in terms of their ability to analyze the more qualitative and 
subjective aspects of these types of applications.  It is also often quite difficult to quantitatively prove probabilities 
associated with workload factors and performance of the human to perform various functions.  This often times 
becomes a significant and time consuming (and costly) issue in gaining approval for the safety requirements that 
result from using the methodology. 
Note: Considerable consideration has been given in this report to the identification of operational hazards 
potentially associated with TASAR.  However, the report intentionally stops short of performing a quantitative 
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analysis of the safety objectives and probabilities of the barriers provided by the mitigations identified, since 
TASAR was determined to have a “No Effect” or in worst case a “Minor” Failure Effects Classification.  The OSA 
presented is thus an abbreviated OSA relative to [5].   
7.1. Operational Hazards Identification 
Before commencing with the identification of Operational Hazards using the Method 2 OSA approach in this 
section, it is noted that the same high-level factors and mitigation already described in Section 6 also apply here.  
The next step takes a closer look at Operational Hazards that could occur using the TASAR application. 
As indicated previously, Operational Hazards result from Abnormal Events and Basic Causes , which represent 
errors and failures in actions associated with the human operator (e.g., the pilot), or systems functions (e.g., TASAR 
automation).  Abnormal Events include both errors by the pilot in relation to TASAR use and in interactions with 
ATC as part of the Change Request procedure. 
In order to more closely examine potential sources of errors associated with actions by humans and TASAR 
automation processing, Figure 4 illustrates the potential information flows within TASAR. 
 
 
 
Figure 4  TASAR Functional Diagram 
Note: The information elements identified in Figure 4 are notional at this point and are being refined as part of 
the detailed design of TASAR. 
The following sections address potential sources for errors and misleading information that may result in 
Operational Hazards stemming from information exchanges associated with human and automation processing 
actions as illustrated in Figure 4. 
7.2. Human Actions Potentially Leading to Abnormal Events 
The following list identifies human actions that provide the opportunity for occurrence of Abnormal Events 
(i.e., when human actions are performed in error): 
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1) Pilot, flight crew 
a. Enters TASAR configuration, objectives, and optimization criteria via the TASAR human machine 
interface (HMI) 
b. Receives and interprets TASAR data via the TASAR HMI (e.g., recommended trajectories, conflict 
status, fuel reserve status, etc.) 
c. Communicates Change Requests to ATC 
2) Air Traffic Controller (en-route) 
a. Provides separation assurance services 
b. Communicates Change Request clearances to pilots 
Note: As the detailed design for TASAR is being developed, there is a concern that some route and constraint 
data may not be readily accessible from onboard systems and that it may be necessary that some of this data be 
manually entered by the pilot.  This raises the potential of increased pilot workload that may become a concern for 
usability of the TASAR application and could factor into the operational safety assessment as a workload issue; it 
may also increase the possibility of false data entry by the pilot. 
7.3. Automation Processing Actions Potentially Leading to Basic Causes 
The following action performed by the TASAR automation (i.e., decision support algorithms) that provides the 
opportunity for occurrence of Basic Causes (i.e., when actions by automation are erroneous): 
TASAR-related processing that could result in undetected misleading information. 
Any misleading information provided by information sources to TASAR, or errors and failures in TASAR 
automation processing, could potentially result in misleading Change Request candidates being recommended to the 
pilot for consideration.  Such misleading information may detract from the usability of TASAR to achieve 
operational benefits.  However, since the flight crew has no authority to deviate from their ATC clearance, 
regardless of the information provided by TASAR, any occurrence of misleading information from TASAR will be 
non-hazardous in nature and is completely mitigated by the ATC clearance procedure. 
7.4. Potential Basic Causes  
The following represent potential Basic Causes associated with TASAR erroneous information: 
1) Own-ship and/or traffic information (e.g., state, intent information) are incorrect or incomplete, leading 
to Change Request candidates that have a conflict, but are presented as conflict free 
2) Wind data is of poor quality or is incorrect leading to Change Requests that are conflicted or lead 
towards hazardous airspace 
3) Convective weather information is of poor quality or is incorrect leading to Change Requests toward 
hazardous airspace 
4) Airspace status information is incorrect leading to Change Requests toward hazardous airspace 
5) Detected errors, failures, or poor quality TASAR recommendations leading to pilot troubleshooting 
and therefore additional workload 
6) Undetected errors or failures of TASAR computations leading to poor or multiple Change Requests 
and additional pilot or ATC workload 
7) Undetected errors or failures of TASAR computations leading to hazardous encounters with weather, 
terrain, Special Activity Airspace, etc. 
8) TASAR application preoccupies the pilot from observing flight-deck hazard alerts 
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7.5. Potential Operational Hazards and Mitigations 
The following represents the detailed list of Operational Hazards (OH) that have been identified using the OSA 
process described in this section.  Associated mitigations, internal or external to TASAR, are also identified. 
OH – 1: TASAR provides one or more Change Request candidates that are not conflict free  
 This Operational Hazard is the result of poor information quality and/or mixed ADS-B Out equipage 
environment, where not all traffic is known. 
 Mitigation – ATC provides separation assurance independent of TASAR. 
OH – 2: Pilot misinterprets TASAR candidate and unknowingly requests a trajectory clearance that is not 
conflict free or leads toward hazardous airspace 
 TASAR “inadvertently” misleads or confuses pilot who misrepresents TASAR Change Request 
recommendation to ATC. 
 Mitigation – ATC provides separation assurance independent of TASAR. 
 Mitigation – Aircraft safety systems (e.g., Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, weather 
radar, Terrain Awareness and Warning System) provide hazard detection and alerting. 
OH – 3: Pilot follows the wrong trajectory clearance following receipt of amended clearance from ATC 
 The pilot requests a change recommended by the TASAR system, and although ATC amends the 
request, TASAR-induced confusion leads the pilot to follow the request instead of the clearance. 
 Mitigation – ATC monitors execution and intercedes (same as today). 
 Mitigation – Pilot training. 
 Mitigation – Pilot crosschecks clearance with FMS. 
OH – 4: ATC, somehow being aware of TASAR capability for the aircraft / pilot requesting a Change Request 
to the flight plan, is less vigilant to provide separation assurance 
 The concern is whether ATC could become complacent over time, when receiving TASAR requests.  
Note that TASAR equipage is not specified on filed flight plans or included in pilot-request verbiage. 
 Mitigation – Existing ATC procedure to check all requests for separation. 
 Note: This is not a credible Operational Hazard because separation assurance is ATC‟s primary 
responsibility. 
OH – 5: TASAR provides numerous spurious and/or inconsistent series of Change Request candidates leading 
to multiple requests 
 If Change Request recommendations are not reinforced from one request to the next, multiple 
counteracting requests could be issued. 
 These requests become a nuisance issue and potentially could lead to a workload issue for ATC. 
 Mitigation – ATC denies user requests if workload is too high. 
OH – 6: TASAR recommends a trajectory candidate with miscomputation of fuel burn 
 Pilot reliance on TASAR fuel burn estimates (prevented to help pilots choose between multiple request 
options) could lead to greater fuel burn than expected. 
 Mitigation – Pilot crosschecks of FMS prediction of fuel burn. 
OH – 7: Unexpected weather develops on TASAR recommended route after ATC approval 
 Unexpected weather could require additional Change Requests and therefore more fuel to be used. 
 Mitigation – Normal procedures for responding to unexpected weather. 
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Reviewing the above Operational Hazards, it is noted that due to the very strong and significant mitigations 
already provided by ATC separation assurance and pilot procedures in today‟s very safe operations, the worst case 
safety effect could potentially be workload for pilot and controllers.  Since TASAR is an advisory-only system and 
can be manually inhibited by the pilot at any time, for any reason, the most likely Failure Effect Classification for 
TASAR would be “No Effect”.  With the “No Effect” or perhaps “Minor” Failure Effect Classification, TASAR is 
amenable for integration as an EFB application.  As noted previously, TASAR is intended for a Class 2 EFB and 
Type B software application or an equivalent type of software category yet to be determined by FAA approvers. 
8. Summary 
This report provides the results of safety analyses of the NASA TASAR application.  TASAR is intended to be 
integrated as a PED EFB software application.  TASAR is an optional, advisory-only decision support tool to 
recommend trajectory change improvement opportunities to the pilot for operational efficiency improvements to 
flight operations.  As such, TASAR is supplemental equipment, does not replace any required avionics functions, 
and is not needed as part of the MEL for flight operations.  Use of TASAR is at the discretion of the pilot, i.e., the 
pilot may choose to ignore TASAR or can manually inhibit its operation at any time for any reason. 
Two safety analysis methods were followed to determine the expected Failure Effects Classification for 
TASAR, 1) a traditional system safety process based on ARP 4761 [2], AC 25-1309 [3], and AC 23-1309 [4], and 2) 
an Operational Safety Assessment using the methodology of RTCA DO-264 / EUROCAE ED-78A [5].  Due to the 
relatively low-criticality of the TASAR application per the description of the TASAR Intended Function in Section 
5, and the availability of a number of significant mitigation barriers used in today‟s operations that greatly reduce 
the probability of TASAR-induced safety effects, both analyses support a TASAR Failure Effects Classification 
of “No Effect” and no higher than a “Minor” effect.  Final determination of the TASAR Failure Effects 
Classification will require FAA‟s review and assessment of the TASAR safety case similar to what is presented in 
the report. 
In a separate companion study to this report, an assessment of TASAR was made to determine EFB Standards 
Adherence Requirements [6].  From an EFB software and application perspective, TASAR, as a new application, 
does not map directly into already defined Type A or Type B applications.  The TASAR application has many of the 
characteristics of a Type B application, yet it is somewhat less stringent than typical Type B applications in terms of 
Failure Effect Classification per its intended function.  In addition, TASAR is expected to be implemented as a Class 
2 PED EFB.  The Class 2 EFB requirement is due to the read-only interface needed by TASAR to on-board avionics 
systems, and data link connectivity via installed antennas for accessible information sources, e.g., weather 
information, etc.  As a Class 2 EFB, a mounting device is required for operators to use TASAR.  The safety 
assessments made in this report are consistent with the EFB Standards Adherence Requirements identified in [6].   
Following the assessments made and documented in this report, and in conjunction with the analysis of EFB 
Standards Adherence Requirements, the next steps of the TASAR EFB Certification and Operational Approval 
process are to 1) develop a plan for TASAR certification and operational approval, and 2) develop representative 
artifacts for such approvals in order to conduct an approval „dry run‟ with a Designated Engineering Representative.  
The resulting artifacts will serve as initial inputs in support of initial applicants engaging with FAA for actual 
TASAR certification and operational approval.   
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